【國際關係深度評 🇮🇱🇮🇷】 以色列、伊朗大戰此刻爆發的深層結構（一）
Added 2025-06-18 02:01:01 +0000 UTC在過去一年，這裏不時提及以色列總理內塔尼亞胡的世界觀，上週剛說到就算美國總統特朗普有意和伊朗「做deal」，以色列也依然會希望儘快摧毀伊朗核設施。言猶在耳，這一場恍惚突如其來的戰爭就出現。不少朋友擔心戰事會進一步擴大：以戰略縱深而言，大概是依然受控的，但在時間緯度來說，卻可能已經失控。要作沙盤推演，就必須理順大戰此時此刻爆發的深層原因：
伊朗一直威脅以色列的生存權，以色列擔心伊朗一旦擁有核武，自己就隨時被滅國，因此是最積極主張移除伊朗核能力、乃至要推翻伊朗現政權的國家。這些都是老生常談，不是近年才出現。只是兩國領土並不接壤，主要不空降地面部隊，攻勢再凌厲也是隔靴搔癢，維持某種恐怖均勢。
伊朗抗衡以色列的憑藉，本來是在區域內建立了一個龐大、複雜、有效的跨國附庸網絡（所謂抵抗軸心「Axis of Resistance」），讓以色列投鼠忌器，作為本土的屏障。然而加沙戰爭爆發後，伊朗的主要附庸哈瑪斯、真主黨、敘利亞巴希爾政權、也門胡塞武裝等等，除了後者還有一定勢力，大多已經被以軍摧枯拉朽的大規模削弱。以軍氣勢如虹，就出現了乘勝追擊、一勞永逸推翻伊朗伊斯蘭共和國的計劃。
但以色列直接大規模進攻伊朗，哪怕只是空襲，也是要承擔後果的。以色列軍備雖然先進，但始終不可能完全攔截所有從伊朗射來的導彈；而當出現平民傷亡，國內民意可以隨時逆轉。畢竟主動挑釁和被動還擊的性質不同，為了復仇可以團結國民，但被復仇卻可以令民間反感。而且區域一旦持續陷入大戰，不可能不影響以色列國內民生，如果沙特等鄰國發展順利，還會改變經濟勢力平衡。
問題是內塔尼亞胡一旦沒有了戰爭，民望就會打回原形。不要忘記加沙戰爭前，他本來已經差點因為司法改革引起的示威下台；目前依然有貪污指控在身；現在又因為取消對極端保守派徵兵的豁免，而陷入盟友背棄的危機。國會一度討論解散提前大選（雖然沒有通過），而此時大選對他並無勝算。這時候和伊朗開戰，恐怕又是他本人的政壇續命丹。
不過平行而論，若說內塔尼亞胡只是關心自己政途，毫無政治理念，也不盡然。他自然知道早晚還是會下台的，固然希望全身而退，但也看重歷史名聲。如果可以在他任內一勞永逸解決伊朗問題，不但下台後有了若干人身安全保障，甚至可能成為國父級、或起碼是梅雅夫人級的領袖。自身的短期危機越大，他歷史留名的動力就越強。
這時候，除了伊朗附庸解體，特朗普重新上台這個因素，也令內塔尼亞胡覺得此刻全力進攻伊朗是歷史機遇。
（待續）
Comments
之前烏克蘭破壞咗一堆俄羅斯軍機，令俄羅斯自顧不暇，會唔會係以色列揀呢個時候發動攻勢嘅原因之一？
Ken Wong
2025-06-18 10:55:51 +0000 UTC最理想結局係，哈梅內衣為咗保護權力交出所有核武俾美國（唔係俄羅斯），以色列停手，大家繼續保持現狀。 不過，哈梅內衣多數唔會咁輕易就範，咁有無可能炸得爛伊朗所有核設施呢？假設炸咗，又會產生幾多核污染呢？對伊朗人既生活有無大影響？定係核污染可以控制喺一個地理範圍外唔擴散？ 咁如果唔炸核設施，哈梅內依倒台，新上任嗰個領袖或組織，仍然揸住核武，即使口講會同以色列和平共處，又係咪真係信得過？ 如果好似進入敍利亞既內戰狀態，兼持續十年，咁邊一方勢力會控制住啲核設施？核設施由誰控制既不確定性咁高，會唔會做成更危險既結果？有無可能內戰可以打，但係核設施全部由美國看管，所有伊朗競爭勢力都唔准靠近？
KTH
2025-06-18 08:23:03 +0000 UTC「當那日，耶和華與亞伯蘭立約，說：「我已賜給你的後裔，從埃及河直到幼發拉底大河之地， 就是基尼人、基尼洗人、甲摩尼人、 赫人、比利洗人、利乏音人、 亞摩利人、迦南人、革迦撒人、耶布斯人之地。」」 創世記 15:18-21
Carl Yang
2025-06-18 07:13:35 +0000 UTCIsrael’s decisive and triumphant operations against the Axis of Resistance have emboldened it to take on Iran directly, challenging the long-held view that Iran’s missile arsenal and proxy network render it untouchable. The scale of the attacks, the choice of targets, and the statements from Israeli leaders suggest a broader, long-term strategy: not merely to disrupt Iran’s nuclear ambitions but to destabilize—or even topple—the regime itself. I think a key driver of this approach is the recognition that Israel cannot fully and permanently dismantle Iran’s nuclear program through military means, even with the supply of America’s bunker buster bombs aimed at Fordow. Moreover, despite Tehran’s outward projection of unyielding authoritarianism, the regime faces growing internal discontent. This opposition extends beyond the capital, where Western journalists often focus, to smaller cities and rural areas across Iran. Decades of economic stagnation have left Iran’s economy fragile, and Israeli strikes on critical infrastructure, such as oil refineries, could exacerbate these vulnerabilities. Israel’s unprecedented escalation seeks to exploit Iran’s vulnerabilities, aiming to reshape the region’s power dynamics at a rare moment of opportunity. The only leverage left for Iran, after depleting its missile stockpile, is blockading the Strait of Hormuz. However, if this trump card is played, it would directly harm its close allies and itself while disrupting Western economies thereafter. With Biden's Afghan legacy marred by the Taliban's resurgence, American deterrence has weakened, emboldening foes to bring upheavals across regions like Ukraine and the Middle East. From the perspective of national interests, Trump has the potential to reinvigorate the policy of "peace through strength" by shaping Washington’s responses to the Israel-Iran conflict, thereby signaling to adversaries that the US is prepared to defend its interests through military might. To honor his “no new wars” promise from his campaign, Trump could flex his hard-power muscles only through airstrikes, military aid, and intelligence sharing, rather than sending ground troops into war zones or expanding troop deployments in the Middle East, provided that this war doesn’t become a Russia-like quagmire. But this scenario is unlikely to occur because Israel and Iran don’t share a land border, and they have absolutely no incentive to send ground troops onto each other’s soil. Moreover, Iran’s inventory of missiles cannot sustain indefinite waves of attacks. By assisting Israel in neutralizing Iran's nuclear capabilities, Trump could effectively reverse Biden's Afghan misstep and bolster deterrence strategies. Failure to support Israel in curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions could signal weakness to regional powers like China, potentially jeopardizing its longstanding vague commitment to defending Taiwan. On the contrary, Trump's reinforcement of his red lines against Iran's nuclear program through Israel could underscore the significance of American deterrence, overshadowing the setbacks of the Biden administration and reestablishing a sense of strength and resolve on the international stage. As the endgame of this war is still engulfed by a deep waft of smoke, it’s too early to draw any conclusions at this moment. Yet the Israel-Iran war has brought the most acute foreign-policy dilemma on full display. All of Iran’s allies are barely waiting to see, knowing the stakes are sky-high due to the totally unpredictable consequences of military action or involvement if drawn into this war. No one would be surprised if they privately push back against Iran’s demand for providing military assistance or financial backing. Rarely, if ever, has a deadly quartet with such “close” bonds politically canceled their synergy of deterrence so fast in such an embarrassing way. Their so-called “ironclad bromance” pays mere lip service and appears not strong enough to convince themselves to get embroiled in this intensifying crisis. We owe our gratitude to Israel for exposing the Axis of Upheaval to the world as a paper tiger.
George
2025-06-18 03:36:40 +0000 UTC喺特朗普1.0時代，以色列已經同埃及、約旦、阿聯酋簽署「亞伯拉罕協議」 ，大家大和解，以色列隻手已經伸去其他中東國家。如果以色列打殘咗伊朗，推舉民選政府推翻神權領袖，到時年連胡塞武裝都瓦解，以色列隻手可以伸到好遠，到時區內平衡會被打破，另一極沙地阿拉伯會好擔心以色列勢力，美國就要同兩個盟友周旋。
Terry L
2025-06-18 03:31:38 +0000 UTC「特朗普重新上台這個因素…全力進攻…是歷史機遇」 — this thought might have crossed the mind of not just the Israelis? Technological change — namely shale oil, might have changed the calculus of the US in the Middle East forever. Iran having an atom bomb is in no one’s interest, but is the material, infrastructure or knowledge destroyed forever with this war so Iran can never make another bomb down the road? That is, is a military solution possible? And what does history say about the odds of successful regime change operations by the US? What does Netanyahu’s track record say about bringing peace through force? The US and Israel have demonstrated their military superiority. But being a small nation Israel have clear limits, and the US have exposed theirs recently also, they cannot rely on gun power alone to solve all their problems. But what role does US diplomacy serve in the region after this? Treachery, surprise, accidents and errors are the essence of war. Is the chance of nuclear war higher or lower after this?
lyk
2025-06-18 03:27:17 +0000 UTC伊朗無限接近擁核都應該係事實
Good Year
2025-06-18 03:15:45 +0000 UTC等了很久！謝謝教授
Ancient
2025-06-18 02:15:20 +0000 UTC
