Russia-Ukraine Flash Report for 5-11-22 14:00 PDT - What's Next

I prefer to have a humble approach, avoiding things like, "ehem, I told you so," and watch other pundits and journalists with more prominent platforms come to the same conclusions we reached days before. (and yes, I do get some pleasure out of saying - Russian forces claimed to have captured Rubihzne, again, and they didn't). If you do some reading among larger news organizations, you will see a lot of declarations. The Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine is somewhere between floundering and over.

One of our Patreons messaged me just a little while ago asking if we knew how many BTGs are left in Ukraine. I responded it was a timely question because we were asking that question among ourselves this morning.

In our situation report, we accounted for Russian BTGs in the Izyum area because other experts have well documented this. Information from the Ukrainian General Staff, social intelligence, and the Russian Ministry of Defense statements have helped keep tabs on the total number.

I missed something from the Institute for the Study of War Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, their position on counting Russian BTGs to calculate total combat power. It's a great read. I recommend it as a companion to the Situation Report. They provide insight into the higher-level strategies and goals -  this isn't our expertise.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment for April 21, 2022 - ISW 

As with Russian operations elsewhere in Ukraine, reporting on numbers of BTGs without additional context and analysis of the combat power of these units is not a useful evaluation of Russian forces.

On April 25, we wrote this assessment.

The UK MoD estimate aligns with the leaked number from the Russian Ministry of Defense on April 22. At 60,000 KIA, WIA, and MIA, Russia has suffered 31% casualties of their deployed forces in Ukraine. On March 26, we estimated losses of 19.6%, providing an additional data point that supports the current estimate. Combat power for the combined Russian forces in Ukraine is likely at or just below 70%, rendering the Russian military assembled in Ukraine combat ineffective.

I've attached the SITREP from 4/25 for your reading pleasure if you're thinking about supporting Malcontent News via Patreon.

A week after that report, we concluded that the Russian Phase 2 operation had reached its apex. Without a dramatic change in Russian tactics and strategy, a dramatic and dangerous escalation, or a mass mobilization, Russian troops would be able to hold their positions and make small targeted advances. However, the Russian offensive was incapable of achieving its military goals.

It's May 11, and the situation has degraded further.

During the siege of Kyiv, we repeatedly stated that Russia would never capture Kyiv without Chernihiv under full Russian control. Without Chernihiv, it would be impossible to establish stable Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC - aka supply lines). History tells us the rest of the story.

That's Kharkiv today. Russian forces were forced to go on the defensive east of the Siveskyi Donets River from the Russian border to Izyum. Without Kharkiv locked to the north and the east, Russia can't maintain stable GLOC to Izyum.

Russian military leaders did make some adjustments after the defeat at Kyiv. They better protect their GLOC, staging supplies better, and make sure their troops at least have dry ratios. We initially saw the use of air cover to escort supply lines and then hit targets of opportunity from the forward positions. For three days, Russian forces advanced in a systematic, disciplined way from three columns south of Izyum. For reasons that history one day will reveal, it all stopped. They returned to the same World War II doctrine they used in Kyiv.

Heavy artillery attack to soften up enemy positions, move forward with armor into the defensive areas, rinse, recycle, repeat. We saw this exact strategy applied east of Lyman, where Russian forces shelled the woodlands around Yampil for four days straight. The Russian advance on Yampil never materialized.

The data we're seeing today is that all of the Russian offensive pushes from Kherson to Izyum in the last 24 to 48 hours have resulted in massive losses for minimal territorial gain. In my opinion, we've reached a tipping point in the war. I believe Russia can still find targeted victories in individual battles but can no longer achieve any of its goals.

I have no insight into what Phase 3 will look like, but the Phase 2A war of attrition is ending.