Russia-Ukraine Flash Report for 5-24-22 09:30 PDT - Severodonetsk Salient

We have stated in the Situation Reports that Russia has the capability to take the Severodonetsk salient if they dramatically improve their tactics and concentrate their power. Things would still have to tip in favor of the Russian advance. They would likely be diminished to the point of being incapable of advancing further and at significant risk of being able to hold their territorial gains beyond the short term (aka into the fall of 2022).

Russia changed its tactics, focused its resources, and has done everything it needed to do. After the multiple disasters for Russian forces along the Siverskyi Donets River from May 8 to May 15, things have not gone the way Ukraine would want.

In our assessment, Ukraine cannot hold the Severodonetsk salient, and there is growing evidence that a withdrawal is beginning. Russian claims of imminent encirclement, 40,000 troops (and 5,000 more at Avdiivka), and bluntly put - fake news. Ukraine doesn't have ten brigades in the Donbas and another full brigade plus in Avdiivka.

The pause on Sunday and into Monday was likely to consolidate positions and possibly due to unfavorable weather on Sunday for air operations. For the first time in this entire war, Russia is heavily using aircraft. Bluntly put, we have many questions about where the MANPADS are.

Russian forces have just about cut off the T-1302 highway at Soledar and Bilohorivka (Donetsk Oblast - not the failed river crossing). This isn't the only Ground Line of Communication (GLOC - aka supply line), but it is the most important one.

There is pretty strong intelligence that Ukrainian forces are doing an orderly withdrawal from Lyman. There is equally strong intelligence that positions in and around Severodonetsk are no longer receiving reinforcements. All signs point to a strategic withdrawal to live to fight another day. 

This probably raises many questions - mostly where will the new line of conflict fall. We aren't armchair generals, and there isn't enough battlefield data for us to analyze and go, "ah-ha, they are setting up here." I think it is a safe assumption Ukraine will fight to hold Bakhmut, and Russia has little interest in conducting a siege at Slovyansk. If Russian forces keep pushing onto Slovyansk two possibilities:

1) Commanders are being told by the Kremlin to keep moving, and it will be a disaster - everything points to Russian forces reaching or at the breaking point. We wrote yesterday in our SITREP that based on available figures, the Russian BTGs involved in the Donbas have, on average, 500 troops each - that's half strength. They are supported by Wagner Group mercenaries and DNR/LNR militias to bulk those numbers up. 

2) Or, everything from an intelligence standpoint, both officially and unofficially, about Ukrainian and Russian capabilities is wrong - e.g., Russia is much stronger than advertised, and Ukraine is much weaker than advertised. To be clear, this seems very unlikely.

Given the Russian Ministry of Defense said out loud that Slovyansk and Kramatorsk are a singular fortress, it seems unlikely they will push on. Morale is very low, and a growing number of LNR/DNR militias want out. The raising of Russian flags in captured villages, not the separatist flag, is causing discontent among loyalists. Many don't want to be part of Russia  - or Ukraine - they want an independent state.

We expect to see the map changing a lot in the coming days. We maintain that Russian forces do not have the resources to hold territory in the moderate or long term and will have to deal with an insurgency.

Even among the loyal, the Luhansk Oblast has been ground to dust. There is no water, electricity, natural gas, petrol, Internet, cellular service, sewer, or trash collection. Russian forces still have a challenging time feeding themselves, and Chechen occupiers have proven that they have no loyalty to anyone under their control. The region is covered in unexploded munitions and landmines - including antipersonnel and butterfly-style devices. Russian soldiers are not trained or capable of being administrators and civil engineers.

Would anything have changed the outcome? Airpower. If Ukraine had better airpower, this would be a different situation. However, a Mig-29 pilot cannot jump into an F-15 or F-16 and be competent. A Su-25 pilot cannot jump into an A-10 and be qualified. 

All intelligence indicates Ukraine is playing the long game. They have reinforcements they could throw at the front, but they haven't completed their training. Taking the time to continue training troops properly and operating as NATO units is the right decision, even facing the current reality.

Expect a lot of changes in the maps in the coming days.

The truth matters - and that's the truth.