SamSuka
TheMalcontent
TheMalcontent

patreon


Russia-Ukraine SITREP for 18 FEB 2023 23:59* - Russian Moods are Souring

Are you new to our Patreon? You need to click on the link to download the PDF attachment.

This is Report 305 and is 46 pages.

What's the big story? It's not on the battlefield. Gloom and doom about Russia's ability to "win" in Ukraine are spreading past the usual suspects to war reporters, ultranationalists, and military commanders. The disconnect between Gerasimov's hybrid warfare in the information space and a growing list of influential Russian reporters and social media influencers is jarring.

The second story? Bakhmut remains a "tale of two offensives," while Ukraine mostly holds all other defensive lines.

Bonus story? There appear to be renewed discussions about sending fighter planes to Ukraine, and the UK has broken the taboo about sending "long-range" weapons.

The Malcontent News Russia Ukraine War Podcast for yesterday is available on:

Malcontent News cannot operate without your support, and we sincerely appreciate your generosity. Maybe share the report with a friend - if each Patreon brought in one more subscriber - ahhh - a Chief Content Officer can dream.

Russia-Ukraine SITREP for 18 FEB 2023 23:59* - Russian Moods are Souring

Comments

Not a big fan of Ward Carroll but Dr. Justin Bronk is a guest star on his YouTube channel and he goes into great depth about what a fighter could and couldn’t do for Ukraine. He also has written about it on RUSI. Worth reading/watching!

Complicated question and a short time to answer. The biggest game changer is "long-range" weapons. I hate that term because a weapon with a 300km range is not defined as "long-range," and calling them that creates a vision of deep strikes within Russia. Russian logistics remain fragile, and they've moved their hubs just outside HIMARS range. Being able to strike these centers would have a similar impact on Russian offensive capabilities as we saw in August through early November, and it would be worse. The F-16 A and B have no viable ground attack capability, and the C block is limited. Ukrainian airspace is too AD-dense for the A-10, which would have enjoyed a target-rich environment in March 2022 northwest of Kyiv when many Russian AD systems were not operating. We know this because if Bayraktar TB-2 drones could operate with impunity into April, A-10s sure could have. Fighter aircraft with ground attack capability would change the game after short-range weapons with a 150km to 300km range arrived in the theater of war. As Russian units fall back and GLOCs are disrupted, aircraft could do interdiction, SEAD/DEAD, and strike targets of opportunity. There is no single "big hand" conventional weapon in war, although admittedly, the Ukrainians used HIMARS incredibly effectively. Strictly my view and a hot take, what Ukraine needs more of now in no particular order: * Cheap, disposable drones in the tens of thousands capable of dropping mission-specific munitions - this is the fastest/easiest/cheapest solution for the battlefield right now. A hybrid UAV that has hardened mil spec electronics against EW, a bit better-targeting system beyond "guess," but built to a prosumer or commercial standard for production speed and costs. Using a World War II analogy, drones could be the T-34 tanks of the current war. I remain 100% convinced that the drones of 2023 are the biplanes of 1915, and right now, we're around the same phase of rudimentary bomb racks being added to reconnaissance aircraft during World War I. We're past the pilot throwing out a hand grenade or a handful of flechettes. Training would be five weeks, including BASIC military training and infantry combat skills. Units would stand off from the front line between the 1st and 2nd echelons. This is a no-brainer in my mind. * Infantry fighting vehicles and armored fighting vehicles in the high hundreds (1,000ish), more so than main battle tanks. This leans into Ukraine's style of fighting, and with Russia now using squad and platoon-sized attacks, being able to respond in kind while providing cover fire from mission-capable IFVs and AFVs would help save lives and shorten the war. * Main battle tanks, largely because parts for the T-64BV and other models are getting harder and harder to secure, as is 125 mm ammunition. * 155 mm ammunition and M30/M31 rocket production dramatically increased. The West is unwilling to equip Ukraine to fight like a NATO army, which relies heavily on air power, power projection from sea-launched weapons and aircraft, and standoff weapons. Ukraine needs a rate of fire parity with Russia. We have proof of what happens when Ukraine can match Russia shell for shell in Vuhledar. * Short-range stand-off precision weapons of up to 300 km - land-to-land, air-to-land, air-to-ship, land-to-ship, in the hundreds and then sustained supply. * Helicopters (no one is talking about this) for logistics and supply - non-combat missions. Medivac, transport in rear areas, supply, logistics. * Multirole fighter aircraft capable of stand-off attacks with precision weapons, SEAD/DEAD missions, ground attacks on targets of opportunity, and air-to-air combat. Ukraine has become too AD dense for the A-10 to be successful, as much as I want to see brrrrrrrrttttttt. By the time the theater of operations became safe enough for the A-10 to operate in an air superiority environment, the war would be over. Oh, and one last thing, the West has to ignore Russia's fake "red lines."

Would fighter jets make a serious difference or would Ukraine need traditional bombers as well?


More Creators