Russia-Ukraine Flash Report 05 MAR 2023 14:00 PST - Bakhmut Holds

No changes in Bakhmut and reports that the T-506 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) is severed are untrue. It's definitely spicy but still usable. There have been no appreciable changes in territorial control.

Is it because Ukraine keeps bringing in fresh troops?

Is it because Russia is exhausting its combat potential?

Is it because mud is slowing down offensive operations?

Is it because Russia is in an operational pause to consolidate a new offensive push?

Is it because Russia has recently found a copy of Sun Tzu's Art of War and read the part about leaving a golden bridge for your enemy?

Is it because of Russian ammunition shortages?

Is it because Ukraine has figured out how to counter Russia's shift in tactics from armor-heavy assaults of a platoon or company size to wave after wave of light infantry squad attacks?

That's why you're Patreons, and that's what we're trying to figure out.

Ukraine is continuing to rotate troops, but there are no signs that the number of troops within Bakhmut (estimated at 5K) has increased.

There are indications that Russia is exhausting its combat potential but no proof and too many variables.

Mud doesn't care if you're Russian or Ukrainian - it's mud.

Is Russia in an operational pause? There is a strong possibility this is the situation. Going back to May 2022 and the push on Popasna, Hirske-Zolote, Severodonetsk, and Lysychansk, we saw the cycle of a big push with high casualties to gain 500 to 1500 meters, a two or three-day pause, repeat. However, we have also seen Russia abandon this strategy in 2023.

Sun Tzu wrote to leave a golden bridge for your enemy (a way to retreat). He also wrote that if you plan to storm a fortress, be prepared to suffer heavy losses. PMC Wagner's Prigozhin language indicates he is pointing to the golden bridge of the T-506 Highway because he would rather not suffer heavy losses. Is that because he suddenly cares about penal units, or is it because he's running out of mercenaries?

Russian artillery around Bakhmut has increased, while complaints of ammunition shortages are spreading across almost all other axes. The other exception is Zaporizhia, where Russian artillery activity has increased but not to a level of setting conditions. Ammunition problems are relative, with Russia still able to fire 20K shells a day theaterwide. To set a benchmark, when Russia was attacking Pisky in August, they were launching 6,000 shells a day - at Pisky. When they were attacking Severodonetsk in June, they were firing up to 40,000 shells - at Severodonetsk and the surrounding villages. Russia is able to fire 2X to 4X the shells Ukraine can, but the improved accuracy and lethality of the NATO-provided systems equalize the imbalance.

Has Ukraine figured out how to counter Russia's light infantry swarm attacks? In some cases, yes, and this could be a factor. Ukrainian junior officers are reporting that military units with flexible senior commanders that apply NATO command structure are able to overcome, adapt, and improvise. Units with more rigid thinking, "you must defend this trench," not so much. It is hard to change 30 years of thinking and even harder to do a military-wide purge when you still need experienced commanders.

The situation remains very fluid and could change quickly. As we saw in Lysychansk. There are no indications that Russia's goals have changed, and they will continue to attack Bakhmut at all costs.