Russia-Ukraine Flash Report 06 MAR 2023 13:30 PST - Ukraine Falls Back in Bakhmut

Our assessment from March 3 continues to age well. There is strong evidence that Ukrainian forces withdrew from the Zabakhmutka District to the west bank of the Bakhmutkova River. The map will be updated shortly.

In our assessment, this is one of the last moves on the Bakhmut chessboard for Ukrainian forces. If Russian troops breach the river and enter the center of Bakhmut, Ukraine will (and should) withdraw from the city. It is important to note that Russian forces have never successfully executed a contested wet crossing anywhere in Ukraine. With the spring thaw and rainy season arriving, crossing the river will be made more complicated in the coming weeks.

The situation to the north and south is, as military public relations officers say, "difficult but controlled." That applies to Russia and Ukraine. Troop rotations are ongoing, so reports that Bakhmut is in a technical encirclement with full fire control over the west Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC) are untrue.

We left a video out of yesterday's SITREP by accident - Ukrainian forces remain at the Mig-17 statute in southwestern Bakhmut, and the area does not appear to have been subject to intense fighting.

Disagreements in Kyiv

There are rumors/reports that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his military commanders are increasingly at odds on how to move forward in Bakhmut. We can't confirm this, but we will add that healthy debate between civilian and military leadership is a cornerstone of a functional Democracy. The General Staff and Eastern District military leaders want to press on with the defense and believe the situation is under control.

Ukrainian Losses Reaching Unacceptable Level

There is a story in the Kyiv Independent today of extreme losses in Bakhmut and units with as little as two weeks of training being sent to the front line. We received an anecdotal report from one of our reporters in Ukraine of a company suffering an 83% casualty rate and needing to be withdrawn. There are growing complaints on the Ukrainian side of ammunition shortages, especially for mortars.

In our assessment, there is validity in these reports, but we can't authenticate a unit suffering 83% casualties (which is why it wasn't in the SITREP). It appears that we're reaching a similar situation to Severodonetsk in mid-June of 2022, where Russian troops were at the edges of the city on three sides, and Ukrainian casualties skyrocketed. There were similar complaints - unprepared territorial guard with little to no artillery support holding defensive lines but with little hope of success. At the time, Kyiv admitted losses were as high as 500 to 1,000 a day.

However, we know that very experienced units like the Ukrainian 93rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade have been fighting in Bakhmut for a month (mostly on the northern flank of the Soledar Operational Area and not within the city itself), so the fight is more than territorial guard doing a rear guard action.

If the loss ratio moves closer to 1:1 or tips over, in our assessment, Ukraine should withdraw but only when viewed through the lens that gazes at Bakhmut only - there is a bigger picture.

Impact on Other Fronts

Fighting has slowed dramatically in Luhansk, with Russian forces rotating out their more experienced units (which there aren't many left) and moving in mobik units largely made up of Russians who have been administratively kicked out of the Russian military and made "volunteers" of the Luhansk People's Republic 2nd Army Corps. There were three more Russian units today that rioted, bringing the count to 12.

It is unclear if the Russian decision to deprioritize Kreminna was part of normal and planned troop rotations, to backfill heavy losses at Vuhledar, to backfill heavy losses and a lack of progress around Avdiivka, to bolster Bakhmut, or a combination.

What is clear is the General Staff in Moscow are being forced into making decisions they almost certainly did not want to make at this stage of their large-scale offensive. As noted in the March 4, 2022 Situation Report, there are too many reports confirmed by too many independent and unrelated sources to dismiss the challenges Russian troops are facing.

PMC Wagner Group's War with the Kremlin

Yevgeny Prigozhin made another statement today claiming that his units are at risk of getting flanked, the ammunition situation is unresolved, and his liaison had their pass revoked to access Russian command. This is a huge change in messaging from 72 hours ago.

We remind our readers that Prigozhin is a successful mercenary leader, an even more successful oligarch, and an even more successful propagandist that has manipulated elections around the world. Nothing he says should be taken at face value without hard evidence.

There is no reason not to believe that Wagner's access has been cut off at the Russian command post because that is very easily disproven. Claims that Ukraine is preparing formations to strike Wagner's exposed flank (almost certainly to the north, which is getting very stretched) can't be proven, and even if we had intelligence, we would respect operational security (we don't).

Are Both Combatants Exhausting Combat Potential?

Unlike Severodonetsk, Russian and Ukrainian forces are complaining equally about ammunition shortages and heavy losses. In Severodonetsk, most complaints were from the Ukrainian side. Ammunition shortages are relative when you consider the potential both combatants have. Russian field commanders are frustrated because they can't fire 60,000 shells/mortars/tank rounds/Grad/Smerch a day. That's 1.8 million in a month, which represents the entire estimated annual production capacity for the Russian Federation. Completely unsustainable. Ukraine, on a good day, can fire 5,000 to 9,000.

To repeat a point, in August 2022, Russia was firing 6,000 non-precision munitions on the village of Pisky a day. Bakhmut is 41 square kilometers, and Pisky is 3.3. If Russia wanted to saturate Bakhmut like Pisky, they would need to fire 74,500 non-precision munitions a day.

That's Russia's idea of "adequate ammunition." 

With reports from both combatants of poorly trained forces fighting each other with a dwindling number of weapons, the question of combat potential is valid. We know that Ukraine has deep, untapped reserves and tens of thousands of troops in advanced training in NATO nations. It does not appear that Russia has similar deep reserves. If they did, we would see them being committed among one of four major operational areas - Kreminna, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, or Vuhledar. The list of Russian units that were trained to be territorial guard, tank, or artillery units, being sent to frontline combat duty with no training and equipped with only light arms and shovels is acceleration.

Both nations are digging deep.  

Counterstrike Battleplan?

A counterstrike battle plan is when you channel your enemy into an area or know in advance that your enemy is going to attack in a location. You prepare defenses and fight as if you're plan is to hold defensive lines at or near all costs. The idea is to lure the enemy into unfavorable positions and conditions and commit their reserves to what they view as an imminent victory.

If that can be achieved, that's when you launch a counterstrike with a larger, well-prepared force. Success may come from the enemy's stretched GLOCs, being in unfavorable terrain, exhausted combat potential, or other factors.

For counterstrike to work, you need the following

• Intelligence - where is my enemy going to attack with what resources
• Reserve forces of adequate strength - enough forces to strike back and be effective
• Time - you can have the first two, but you need time to prepare the entire battleplan
• Secrecy - your enemy can't know about the larger reserve ready to strike, and the troops involved in the initial defense can't know they are bait
• Highly motivated troops - troops holding the first phase of the strategy must be highly motivated to attrit as many enemy forces as possible
• Speed of execution once you commit - once you execute the counterstrike, it must happen quickly to break through the rear echelon and collapse the enemy's offensive

We're not convinced this is Ukraine's plan. Prigozhin's statement about potentially being flanked is more likely about continuing the message in the information space that the Russian Ministry of Defense is incompetent (directed at an internal audience) or setting conditions in the information space on why the siege of Bakhmut is approaching its seventh full month and success has not been achieved. 

What's Next

More fighting. In our final assessment, the Bakhmutkova River is the last line of defense in Bakhmut unless there is a larger battleplan. It will make an excellent natural boundary, not that meteorological winter is over. If the river is breached, or if defensive lines to the north or south collapse, Ukrainian forces should withdraw - but that is based on the information that is visible to the team.