Russia-Ukraine Flash Report 10 JAN 2022 12:30 PST - Gearing Up From Vaca

There is a joke in a group I am in that whenever I step away; big things happen for Ukraine. This wasn't the case this time.

I started wading through intelligence reports yesterday, and I know questions are flooding in. First, I hope everyone enjoyed our interviews; one more is coming later today. Second, there will be a mini-situation report today (surprise), so we can have a podcast tomorrow.

Here is what we're comfortable talking about heading north to south.

The map link will take you to Soledar-Bakhmut.

Luhansk

Ukrainian forces continue to make incremental gains toward Svatove and Kremina. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine declared Dibrova liberated, and by their standards, that indicates most of the forested areas west, north, and east of Dibrova (and by default south) is under Ukrainian control. If Kreminna falls back to Ukrainian control, Ukrainian forces are behind the Wagner Line, and if they take Rubizhne, Bakhmut and Soledar become irrelevant.

Northeast Donetsk

No change in the situation along the Luhansk-Donetsk administrative border. north of Yakovlivka. Fighting is less intense, and Russia and Ukraine are trading 200 to 500 meters back and forth along the line.

Soledar-Bakhmut-Mayorsk

I know this is what everyone wants to know about.

Yakovlivka - Russian forces have not been able to capitalize on the capture of the town last month and have not been able to advance north or west. They may have made some gains southwest toward Soledar, but there is no encirclement or imminent encirclement.

Soledar - A lot of Russian and Ukrainian picture reports in the same area but with squads or smaller-size forces. This only serves to prove that central and eastern Soledar is no man's lands that change control frequently. The salt mines, as of this writing, are under Ukrainian control. The main GLOC into Soledar is under Russian fire control, but with temperatures reaching -20 C, the ground is frozen solid, and there are multiple additional routes. In our view, the situation is very difficult, but the reports that Soledar is captured, or full capture is imminent, are untrue. Russia is "all in" on Soledar and has obliterated the center of the city with artillery at the expense of almost all other areas. There continue to be significant complaints from Russian forces of ammunition shortages and a lack of artillery support outside of Soledar.

Bakhmutske - likely under Russian control, which enabled the advance on the city's southern side and the capture of the highlands in a forested belt. This is where Russian troops have established fire control over the GLOC, putting Russian artillery and mortar units perilously close to the front line of fighting.

Pidhorodne - northeast of Bakhmut - is not under Russian control. We're not sure Russian forces have advanced and held territory north of the gas station. We hedged our bets on the map and had Russian forces further north on the M-03 (E-40) Highway but not to the town itself.

Bakhmut - Russian forces (well, PMC Wagner) is about to where they were on September 26 and pre-Christmas. There was fighting reported "around" the Art Wine Factory again, but no pictures, so we are very skeptical. PMC Wagner is likely in the same two to four blocks of houses on the eastern edge of the city they reached pre-Christmas. 

Opytne - Russia controls about 75% - intense fighting.

Klishchiivka - it appears Russian positions were overstated, or they were pushed back. This region is getting less artillery support and little armor, so Russian troops are moving forward slowly as light infantry with little support. We do believe DRG, squads, and possibly platoon-sized forces of PMC Wagner penal units have reached the town but could not take/hold positions.

Kurdyumivka to Mayorsk - no real change here. Russian forces are held at the canal. DRG and small units are crossing, moving into the tree line, and getting destroyed.

Southwest Donetsk

No changes since December 29. Fighting on the Avdiivka axis continues, particularly the usual suspects - Vodyane, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske with no change.

No change at Marinka. The Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) continues to throw resources at Krasnohorivka and Pobjeda with no change.

On the Vuhledar axis, it appears all those Russian Ministry of Defense reports of fighting around Mykilske and Volodymyrivka were hiding the fact that Ukraine was making incremental gains. Nothing major, small changes, but Vuhledar is safe, and we see nothing (at least as of this writing) to indicate any big push is coming.

Zaporizhia

Ukrainian forces made a number of incremental gains along almost the entire axis. Some of this was new fighting, and new pictures, videos, and news reports clarified other details. The biggest change is on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia administrative border west of Velyka Novosilka, where Russian forces have been pushed back from the T-509 Highway. Ukrainian forces gained 2 to 5 km in this area and flattened the bulge.

There were some additional adjustments north of Polohy, where Russian troops have started building new defense lines. There is a lot of angst in the Russian blogosphere that a push could come in this area. 

The Rest of Ukraine

No other changes. We expect another Russian missile strike soon, considering their historic pattern (it is overdue). The lack of a large-scale follow-on strike indicates there is some truth to the Shahed-136 drones having operational issues in cold temperatures and a dwindling supply of missiles for Russian strategic forces. 

Weapons Aid

While 50 Bradley fighting vehicles is a good start, that isn't enough to equip a brigade. By our estimation, Ukraine needs - 2,400 infantry fighting vehicles/armored scout vehicles/etc. - to properly equip and arm their 24 mechanized infantry brigades.

Hot Take (Not Analysis)

Six months ago we repeatedly assessed that Russia lacked "grunts with guns" to take and hold territory. That artillery and armor could flatten Ukrainian defenses and move forward but lacked the troop strength to hold captured territory. That played out as assessed, including on the Izyum Axis, where our analysis going back to June was spot on. 

Now Russia has plenty of grunts with guns but lacks armor, artillery, and air support. They can advance slowly in bloody attritional warfare. Ukraine and Russia share a similar problem. Both have plenty of older military hardware, such as the BMP-1. The BMP-1's main gun is low velocity and essentially useless on the battlefield except when engaging open troops or other BMP-1s, pickup trucks, SUVs, cars, etc. 

The lack of armor is preventing either side from making a meaningful breakthrough. Further, the lack of infantry fighting vehicles for both sides means that infantry can't keep up with tanks. Tanks can punch through unsupported and then get wrecked.

This is why we have a frozen front. In Soledar and Bakhmut, Russia is throwing bodies in continuous waves at Ukrainian defenses. In Soledar, Russian VDV forces have taken over the fighting from PMC Wagner, and that is why gains are being made. The cost? Some of the last experienced and well-equipped troops in the Russian military.

We maintain that without Izyum, Soledar/Bahkmut is pointless. If Ukraine captures Kreminna, the Russian Ministry of Defense will have to make some major decisions about the future of the Luhansk Oblast and its position under Russian control.