What Say You? 13 JAN 2023 17:15 PST - Why Did Infrastructure Strikes Slow Down

It has been over two weeks since the last large-scale missile and drone attack on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. While the power grid operates at 50% of its prewar capacity, it still operates along with trains, critical infrastructure, and factories. After three months of attacks that cost the Russian Ministry of Defense billions of dollars, there is very little to show for it. Although life isn't easy, Ukrainians are not freezing to death in their homes.

General of the Army Sergey Surovikin was made the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine and put in charge of the "special military operation" on October 8. The first widescale attack on energy infrastructure occurred on October 10, and the last and least successful happened on December 27.

Before his command in Ukraine, Surovikin was the commander of the Russian air force and air defenses and was the architect behind the campaign targeting Syria's powerplants and civilian infrastructure - earning him the nickname General Armageddon. While the Russian Ministry of Defense has repeatedly taken the "it worked in Syria" approach, there may be more to this story.

I am not suggesting that Surovikin hatched his plan to destroy Ukraine's energy infrastructure on October 8 and 48 hours later coordinated a strike involving up to 80 missiles across the country. With Surovikin commanding the strategic bomber forces of Russia, it seems very likely that part of the reason he got the job was pitching a plan to take out Ukraine's infrastructure before the start of winter. While he was in charge in Ukraine, the attacks occurred on a steady rhythm of roughly once a week. By mid-December, Ukrainian air defenses had improved, and Russia either ran out of or was having technical issues with the Iranian-sourced Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, which have also become conspicuously absent from Ukrainian air space.

Here is the theory. The attacks ended on December 27 because they hadn't achieved their goal, and Surovikin, by that point, was on the way out. Just as Hermann Goering told Adolf Hitler that the Luftwaffe could bomb Great Britain into submission, Surovikin made a similar promise supported by a dwindling supply of Kalibr cruise missiles launched from the Black Sea Fleet. Just like in 1940 Germany, the field reports on success and Ukrainian losses of infrastructure and air defenses were exaggerated, creating a view within the Kremlin of "just one more attack will do it." Eventually, the "picture reports" collided with reality, and the risk reward became too high. Someone had to take the blame.

If the theory is correct, it is not to say that continued attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure won't continue. The Russian Ministry of Defense prefers targeting civilian infrastructure and locations that can't fight back. But it does suggest that the weekly attacks on Ukrainian power plants using 40 to 100 missiles and drones are over, and it ended with Surovikin's demotion. 

What say you? Where did the missile strikes go?