Russia-Ukraine Flash Report 20 MAY 2023 14:30 PDT - Did Bakhmut Fall?

Sort of.

Yesterday's bullet report eluded to Ukrainian forces holding maybe one square kilometer of territory around the former Mig-17 statute and a few houses in the northern part of the city east of Khromove.

PMC Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin 📺 declared Bakhmut fully under Russian control on May 20, 2023, at noon Moscow time. A few things about the video.

We geolocated the video to the central part of Bakhmut, east of the train tracks and at the western edge of Verkhniy Park. We had previously mapped this area as a "green zone" for Russian forces. That is an area far enough behind the lines of main fighting that a Russian soldier could reasonably walk around without worry that 15 seconds later, a mortar or a sniper's bullet will tear off their head. That isn't to say this area isn't subject to mortar or artillery strikes or that Ukrainian DRG/SOF doesn't operate in the area.

The second thing that stands out in the video is the sound of combat is clearly heard throughout the entire statement. Clearly, the city is not under the full military control of PMC Wagner. It's worth noting that a similar claim was made in Soledar, with full military control achieved about 14 days later. Military control is defined as troops can maneuver within the city, but small arms combat is over. The city could still be subject to artillery, mortar, and air strikes, and it is unsafe for any civilians to be in the area. There are secured defensive lines that prevent easy advances into the captured area. 

Bakhmut is not under Russian control, but again, the argument is pedantic. Ukrainian officials 📺 vehemently deny that the area around the Mig-17 statute has been captured, but there is significant fog of war.

Prigozhin has announced now that victory has been achieved, PMC Wagner will continue cleansing operations and set up defensive positions for a transfer to Russian forces on May 25, and they're leaving for "other hotspots" around the world. He appears to be back to they are leaving the theater of war in Ukraine, but the Russian Ministry of Defense may have other ideas.

After Prigozhin claimed on May 9 that the Russian Ministry of Defense would charge him and his mercenaries with treason if they arbitrarily withdrew from Bakhmut, we reassessed that PMC Wagner would do everything it could to declare "mission accomplished" in Bakhmut to provide an off-ramp out of Ukraine.

Further, there is strong intelligence that the Rapid Support Force in Sudan, which opposes the Sudanese military, has signed a large contract with PMC Wagner. As for how Wagner is paid, they have extensive gold mine interests in Sudan. And gold is much easier to launder into currency than - currency. 

It is unclear what type of defenses PMC Wagner can build under fire in less than five days, and much like Marinka, with the western half of Bakhmut looking like a nuclear bomb hit it, there aren't a lot of defensible areas for Russian occupiers. Further, the reserves that have been brought into the area of Bakhmut have low combat potential and poor training.

As for a recent Ukrainian claim that Russian troops are not ill-trained or under-equipped, we disagree with this statement. We have provided dozens of videos in multiple operational areas of Russian troops that lack antitank weapons, are only capable of limited light infantry tactics, and have no armor or artillery support. Certain Russian units are well equipped, but we've documented crowdsource funding for consumer-grade night vision optics for Russian VDV units.

A Ukrainian territorial guard unit is going to be under-trained and under-equipped facing a Russian Naval Infantry unit, just as a Russian mobik unit is going to be under-trained and under-equipped facing the Ukrainian 93rd Motor Infantry Brigade or the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade (fighting south of Ivanivske).

Much like the July 3, 2022, capture of Lysychansk, we don't see Russian forces having the combat potential to convert this operational success into a tactical or strategic victory.

As for the continued attack on the flanks of Bakhmut by Ukrainian forces, we don't see that stopping. We have additional intelligence in the Klishchiivka Operational Area that we still cannot share publicly, which is informing our position that further activity will continue.

If the Ukrainian goal since mid-February was to destroy PMC Wagner, force Russian reserve units away from other operational areas into the Soledar and Bakhmut operational area, and prevent Russian advances from its winter offensive - mission accomplished. We are tracking numerous Russian troop maneuvers to pull reserve forces from what could be a critical area to other regions, only to send those troops back. This is consuming fuel and logistics, and enabling insurgents in Mariupol to provide excellent intelligence on these movements.

We had previously assessed in late September that Russian forces would do everything possible to capture Bakhmut short of CBRN. That assessment was correct.

We had previously assessed in November and again in February that Russian forces lacked the forces required to encircle the Bakhmut Operational Area, and in February added that Russian forces had moved from an encirclement strategy to a push Ukrainian forces out strategy, which would result in heavy Russian casualties due to the defender bonus. That assessment was accurate.

We had previously assessed that if Ukrainian forces were pushed out of the larger buildings in northern and west-central Bakhmut, Russian troops would advance quickly through the residential areas due to a lack of defensible positions. That was also accurate.