Russia-Ukraine Flash Report 08 MAY 2023 14:30 PDT - Russia Leaving Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant?

Russian state enterprise Rosatom announced that plant operations at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant are being shut down, and Energoatom claimed that the 3,100 plant operators are being evacuated. Civilian evacuations have been ongoing in Enerhodar, with Ukrainians accusing Russia of moving troops in and evacuees out on the same vehicles.

Facts First

1) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on May 6 that all reactors were already shut down. I don't understand when Rosatom says that plant operations are being stopped, what they mean. The plant already isn't operating and hasn't generated electricity for the grid since last year. It is worth noting that Energoatom said that wasn't true, but even that would mean only Reactor 5 was operating in a "hot shutdown" state to generate steam and internal electricity. It isn't a giant leap to go from a hot shutdown to a cold shutdown and vice versa.

2) Not to be confused with, "they can't do it," but when a nuclear reactor is in cold shutdown, that doesn't mean "mission accomplished, everyone can go home now." You still need to maintain coolant circulation, the systems that support that, make sure there aren't radiation leaks, etc. Like many other mechanical items, non-use can be even more damaging than improper use or overuse. The plant still needs regular maintenance and monitoring. 

3) To keep that water circulating and other systems operating requires electricity, ideally from somewhere else, and ZNPP only has a single 750 kV connection. Russian officials never made promised repairs at the ZTPP switchyard for an emergency 330 kV connection and prevented IAEA onsite inspectors to view the issue/damage. The non-stop shelling of the Nikopol raion has prevented repairs of the 330 kV transformer farm and powerlines in free Ukraine on the west bank of the Dnipro, which Russian shelling damaged on March 1. Losing the 750 kV connection, ZNPP needs to switch to diesel generators. Someone has to be there to monitor that process, load balance, and make sure the generators and their automatic systems are serviced and ready.

Hot Take

Again, not saying Russia "can't do it" or "won't do it," but I find it extremely unlikely that Rosatom is taking 3,100 employees and leaving 1,000 Ukrainian Energoatom employees behind who don't have plant access. You can't convince me for one second that the Russian garrison based at the plant, made up mostly of Chechen  Rosgvardia, has the technical training to operate the facility. They certainly don't have the numbers. As it is, ZNPP is only at 30% to 35% of pre-war staff levels. 

If Rosatom does leave and takes with them the 3,100 full-time plant employees, this is a crisis. Especially if the Russian garrison won't allow Ukrainian engineers to come back in sufficient numbers to run and maintain the plant. That doesn't even answer the question of whether Ukraine can find 3,100 trained engineers to return and how you would move a near brigade-size group of people while keeping Russian commanders, who are on the brink of panic as it is, that these are civilian and critical nuclear plant workers. I don't see the United Nations having the willpower to support that kind of movement with peacekeepers. I don't see the Kremlin accepting, "Trust us."

More than once, Energoatom officials have overstated the risk at ZNPP, as have Rosatom employees. The language from Rosatom and shared through Russian state media is clumsy. What does ending operations mean? As noted above, the plant isn't operating right now - not in the sense that it is generating electricity.

What would happen if Russia does leave and won't allow access to the plant? You can sleep well knowing that, short of some incredibly stupid act, the plant can limp along. How long? Can't fully speculate, but it's measured in weeks or months. If external power connections are lost, all bets are off. The maximum is 10 to 15 days assuming that Russian forces have not plundered the diesel fuel reserve for the onsite electrical generators and the generators operate as designed. Since the IAEA has been at the plant, diesel fuel levels have been maintained.

As of this writing, the IAEA has not made a statement, and we have noticed that Secretary General Rafael Grossi has said a lot less since negotiations to demilitarize the plant and create a green zone around it failed over the winter. The IAEA has also documented there is decreasing cooperation between the IAEA monitors and Russian officials.

Could this be a prelude to an intentional act of sabotage? The only worse mistake the Russian Federation could do would be a CBRN attack, and the most impacted areas would be the Russian occupied territories. It wouldn't make sense.

Bottom Line:

None of this is good, but it is unclear what is really going on. The most important point? There is no need to hit the panic button.