Pill Pod 129 - Canadian Politics Update & Ontological Iceberg Racing (Exclusive)
Added 2023-06-30 19:50:39 +0000 UTCA Toronto election update followed by a discussion about post-structuralism that barely addresses the article we read (attached), and got into a deeper discussion about forms of writing comparing a "generic academic style" c.f. "poststructuralism." We look forward to your thoughtful comments on this because it is always a difficult question to answer what written philosophy is for and even more difficult to answer what it CAN do... I think the question is probably more important than finally answering it.
Comments
You guys still have your version of Obama. That's amazing. Get ready for the terrible Netflix specials that will follow.
Khemith
2023-07-18 10:12:32 +0000 UTCAlso, I’ve got to get my mandatory plug for Reiner Schürmann in here, as he strongly interprets Heidegger as looking for some sort of ‘fundamental ontology’ and focuses heavily on the silent, destructive aspects of the unnamable existence of singular things and actions outside of language, and how such singulars act on our living world of language as a transgressive force which breaks down hegemonies of thought, thus leading into some pretty cool continental political philosophy.
Chet
2023-07-06 20:10:33 +0000 UTCIn response to your point ab Heidegger, I would say that although the tools of the hermeneutical circle and ‘finding the right question’ are products of language and within language games (Heidegger recognizes this in the presentation of an “opening” in history which allows for the recognition of such language games and problems with inquiry) , he is still trying to lay claim to some sort of ‘fundemental ontology’. In the breakdown of time, appropriation and expropriation are seen as basic aspects of the world within and *outside* of language or historicity. This is supported in his recognization of these principles as pre-Socratic in origin, and in his later writings on The Thing. So, like Victor asked in response to phenomenology, “isn’t the claim that we are habituated beings an ontological claim?”, the same could be said for Heidegger and appropriation/expropriation. In Heidegger’s eyes, It’s a view into the singular, unnamable existence outside of language which pills talks ab, achieved through ‘Releasement’ or the detachment from all concepts and the authentic freedom from historicity. Of course pill’s critique still stands, as Heidegger is using language to describe this ‘ontology’, but the later Heidegger would argue that poetic language is able to cross the barrier into the singular, unnamable existence and ‘reveal’ (un)said truths.
Chet
2023-07-06 20:02:13 +0000 UTCSorry but I’m not understanding something. You guys seem to talk about language as if it’s its own thing. But if that’s the case then how could language be held hostage by the image? I’m missing something…
Timothy Kenner
2023-07-06 15:07:58 +0000 UTCWoh, right, thanks so much, Sturdy! And the extended tree from Pills connects with both my tree and yours in a Batesonian Ecology of Mind. Guattari, in his Three Ecologies, begins by quoting Bateson on this topic. It makes perfectly sense why Peirce, von Uexküll, and Bateson are the founding thinkers of Biosemiotics.
Johannex
2023-07-06 14:06:10 +0000 UTCIndeed, Johannes, your statement makes sense from a Peircean perspective. When you refer to "Pills carrying the interpretant in his mind/image of the tree," you're implying that as the Interpreter, Pills holds a mental conception (the interpretant) generated from a sign -- in this case, the tree. This mental image is not just a static entity; it's subject to an ongoing interpretive process guided by Peirce's three types of interpretants. However, it is important to remember that the interpretant is part of a dynamic, evolving process (semiosis) and not a fixed entity in the mind of the Interpreter. Therefore, Pills' understanding of the sign continues to shift and grow with each encounter with the sign, informed by whatever collateral knowledge (new or otherwise) Pills brings to the process.
Sturdy Kind
2023-07-06 13:50:59 +0000 UTCThanks! I meant Pills as carrying the interpretant in his mind/image of the tree. Does that makes sense Sturdy?
Johannex
2023-07-06 11:24:38 +0000 UTC"In this structure, you, Pills, as the interpretant..." Be careful here not to conflate the interpretant with an interpreter (Pills). An interpretant, in Peirce's semiotics, is the understanding or meaning (the mediation of the sign-vehicle and the object's interrelation) that a sign conveys to a mind. Peirce identified three kinds of interpretants: the immediate interpretant (the immediate sense made of a sign), the dynamic interpretant (the effect or impact of a sign on a mind), and the final interpretant (the ultimate understanding or truth to which a sign points). So, the interpretant is the understanding generated by a sign, while the interpreter is the entity (such as a person) that forms this understanding. Peirce emphasized the role of interpretants in his semiotics, considering them a crucial aspect of the process through which signs gain meaning.
Sturdy Kind
2023-07-06 11:09:44 +0000 UTCBanger episode. The backend was refreshing.
Zack Klug
2023-07-05 23:57:12 +0000 UTCAt 1:06 you Pills say ‘Sorry Eric” for arguing in a Saussurean style, right at the moment Eric should, for the first time, explain why the example of the tree you gave, supporting your own argument, is inaccurate. While I'm not a philosopher, I understand that Peirce, with his triadic structure of sign, object, and interpretant, surpasses the Saussurean dyadic model of sign and signifier. In this structure, you, Pills, as the interpretant, contribute significantly to the signification process, embodying the metaphorical tree in your mind. Hoffmeyer refers to this as 'the more developed sign'. When Derrida claims 'there is nothing outside the text', he errs, not philosophically, but in failing to acknowledge that semiotic systems always belong to the 'semiosphere', a term used in biosemiotics. Within this sphere, your example of science, including writing, is just a part of the broader sphere. I recall your surprise at Luhmann's systems theory, where he proposes that systems are disconnected - you mentioned the corruption example as financial interference in the legal system. A potential topic for a future episode could be the extent and manner of connection between semiotic systems. I believe the insights of D&G, Hoffmeyer, Peirce, Sebeok, von Uexkull, Bergson, Heidegger, and Derrida should be incorporated into this discussion. Eric is very much involved into this, I suggested the same recently, now he could finally speak out.
Johannex
2023-07-05 08:14:07 +0000 UTC11:35 Thank you Pills because the crack mayor is exactly who I was thinking of
Alyn
2023-07-04 22:27:33 +0000 UTCOne of the things that still holds from Wittgenstein's Tractatus is the picture theory of language. Language works a lot better when you're talking about something you can draw a literal picture of. "The cat drinks the milk" describes "reality" very well. As long as anyone reads English and is not hallucinating or blind, say, can very easily agree on the veracity of that claim. Is there something we all agree is a "cat"? Can we all draw a "cat"? Is there a cat in our perception at the moment? The same with "milk." Either there is a "cat" "drinking" "milk" or there isn't. Language is useful in that case. And we can all draw pictures of that claim with relative adeptness but we can all draw a picture of it and the viewer will know what the picture is about. Same with the written sentence of it. It's still not "reality" but it represents it fairly usefully. Where language is less useful is when we're talking about things we can't draw pictures of--abstractions. "Freedom," "love," "determinism," "good," "evil" etc., even if we speak the same language none of us can draw pictures that literalize those words. And if we tried we'd all come up with different pictures, and we'd all disagree on who's drawing is more accurate. Hence: politics. Wittgenstein concludes we can never talk about things like "reality" with any usefulness. So maybe we shouldn't. The Investigations was Wittgenstein being a little more optimistic in that, depending on the game we play with language, such conversations can be therapeutic. But the core point of the Tractatus is still more relevant than we give it. And academics still fail to either understand or heed the profundity of that sort of idea. And Wittgenstein isn't even considered a "postmodern" writer.
Joe Green
2023-07-01 18:06:05 +0000 UTCI'm sorry I didn't vote, I couldn't get across the border in time :(.
Ashley H
2023-07-01 18:02:44 +0000 UTCDamn, I could listen to the back part of this one on loop. Whatever that discussion was about, I feel like I need to have it hammered into my brain. To sit and simmer on those ideas and take them to heart in an existing being experiencing being without understanding being type of way...ouf. Damn 1:10:00 has me seeing Being and Time in a new light. Makes sense now why it hurts to read it, probably hurt Heidegger to write it. Did he think himself that he had really established anything, that he was even to successfully phrase the question in words? 1:15:00 how do we get out of this dualism. Thich Nhat Hanhs Plum Village Zen school mantra is The Way Out Is In. Food-for-thought. Some contextual content: Gets to the lecture portion around 20:00, and I think it would go without saying that if you watched this, and had some thoughts on what it brings to mind, that would be most-dope. This raisin meditation is also, most-dope. https://youtu.be/2pSGHUDnS3k Lol science is like: Hey, uh, can you see the same thing as I see here over there...? Yup, sure do! Alright, sounds good!
ageOfBumFires
2023-07-01 11:36:10 +0000 UTC
